Michelle Mantine and Samantha Jones of Reed Smith discuss what luxury’s Birkin case signals for exclusivity and antitrust risk.

The modern luxury market is built on scarcity and storytelling. Limited releases, curated clienteling and selective distribution all reinforce brand identity and consumer desire. The same mechanisms that preserve exclusivity can draw antitrust scrutiny when access to a must‑have product appears to turn on purchasing other goods. The recent decision in Cavalleri vs Hermès International S.A. underscores this line: exclusivity is lawful; coercion is not.

In the Cavalleri case, plaintiffs alleged that access to Hermès’ coveted Birkin handbags was conditioned on buying other Hermès products such as scarves, jewelry and clothing—effectively a tying arrangement. In September 2025, the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California dismissed the case with prejudice, finding the complaint failed to plausibly allege a relevant market, market power in the tying product, or meaningful competitive harm in any tied market. The court’s bottom line: selective sales tactics, without more, are not per se illegal tying absent plausible allegations of competitive harm in the tied market. For luxury brands, the decision offers both reassurance and guidance. It confirms that carefully managed distribution—prioritising loyal or high‑spend clients, reserving limited pieces for select channels—can be consistent with lawful brand strategy when decoupled from coercive conditions that distort competition.

The legal framework matters. Under Jefferson Parish Hospital District No. 2 vs Hyde, a tying claim requires proof of two distinct products, conditioning of access to one on the purchase of the other, sufficient market power in the tying product, and a “not insubstantial” volume of commerce affected in the tied market. While the Supreme Court’s skepticism of tying has softened over time—most notably in Illinois Tool Works—courts today evaluate these practices under a rule of reason standard, balancing competitive harm against legitimate business justifications. In the fashion industry, this balancing test carries particular weight because product curation, quality control, and aesthetic coherence often justify linkages that might look suspect in other sectors.

Cavalleri therefore does not bless “pay‑to‑play” access. Rather, it clarifies the evidentiary bar. Allegations that a boutique encourages cross‑category spend or favours established clients do not, standing alone, establish that customers are compelled to buy unwanted goods or that rivals are foreclosed in a tied market. The analysis turns on market definition, actual conditioning and competitive effects. Where plaintiffs cannot plausibly define the relevant tied markets or show harm in those markets, tying claims falter.

Still, the decision arrives amid an industry‑wide debate over fairness in access and allocation. As brands expand loyalty programmes, experiment with “drops” and integrate online and boutique waitlists, the optics of scarcity can blur into allegations of coercion. The U.S. Department of Justice and Federal Trade Commission continue to flag tying and related vertical practices as forms of exclusionary conduct that potentially can restrict rivals’ access or raise their costs, even while recognising that such practices often are procompetitive when they improve efficiency or preserve product value. That duality is central: vertical restraints can enhance competition by strengthening interbrand rivalry and protecting service or presentation standards—see Sylvania and Leegin—but become problematic where prestige is leveraged as a precondition for access in ways that impede consumer choice.

For luxury leather goods in particular, the access question is often framed through clienteling. Prioritising repeat customers, inviting top clients to special previews, or curating allocations by boutique are well‑established practices that support craftsmanship narratives and control over brand image. Under the rule of reason standard, such measures can be justified when they are necessary and proportionate to genuine quality or presentation objectives. The line may be crossed where allocation strategies functionally condition a Birkin‑level product on purchasing unrelated goods, combined with enough market power and foreclosure to harm competition in the tied product markets.

Cavalleri’s practical signal to market participants is twofold. First, exclusivity remains lawful when grounded in brand protection rather than leverage. Prioritisation policies that reward loyalty are distinct from requirements that force cross‑purchases as a gateway to access. Second, plaintiffs face a rigorous pleading burden in tying cases: they must articulate discrete product markets, sufficiently allege market power in the tying product, and show a not‑insubstantial effect in the tied markets—standards that help screen claims rooted in perceived unfairness from those alleging actual competitive harm.

This does not imply a regulatory vacuum. The agencies’ continued emphasis on exclusionary vertical practices, coupled with the cultural salience of allocation fairness in high‑end goods, suggests that investigative interest will persist, particularly where evidence shows conditioning, coercive sales practices, or meaningful foreclosure effects. Moreover, tying risk is not confined to consumer‑facing sales. Wholesale line‑forcing—granting access to a highly coveted handbag only if retailers agree to take on slower‑moving categories—can raise the same issues if the must‑have item becomes leverage that distorts competition in tied product markets. Licensing and sourcing provisions that require use of affiliated suppliers beyond what quality control necessitates present analogous risks.

The path forward for luxury brands is less about abandoning exclusivity and more about tightening the rationale and guardrails around it. Documented, contemporaneous justifications tied to quality control, brand presentation, inventory stewardship and service standards remain critical under a rule of reason analysis. Sales guidance and training should underscore the difference between encouraging cross‑category interest and conditioning access—an operational nuance that carries significant legal weight. Monitoring market position is also essential. The greater a brand’s influence in a category, the more carefully courts and regulators will parse whether prestige is being used as lawful differentiation or as leverage that impairs downstream competition.

Cavalleri illustrates that exclusivity is not the enemy of competition in luxury. Properly implemented, it can enhance interbrand rivalry and sustain the very attributes—craftsmanship, service, aesthetic coherence—that distinguish the sector. Antitrust risk emerges when scarcity becomes a condition of access, transforming the aura of the object into a gateway for unrelated sales. The decision draws that boundary with renewed clarity: in luxury, exclusivity may shape who gets the call; it cannot dictate what else they must buy to answer it.